By holding that new substantive rules are, indeed, retroactive, Teague continued a long tradition of giving retroactive effect to constitutional rights that go beyond procedural guarantees. Miller, the opinion it wishes to impose upon state postconviction courts, simply does not decree what the first part of the majority’s opinion says Teague’s first exception requires to be given retroactive effect: a rule “set[ting] forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). 8, in our newly enlightened society. Compare, e.g., Martin v. Symmes, 782 F. 3d 939, 943 (CA8 2015); Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F. 3d 219, 224–226 (CA4 2015); Chambers v. State, 831 N. W. 2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013); and State v. Tate, 2012–2763, p. 17 (La. A maxim shown to be more relevant to this case, by the analysis that the majority omitted, is this: The Supremacy Clause does not impose upon state courts a constitutional obligation it fails to impose upon federal courts. If the Constitution prevented courts from enforcing a void conviction or sentence even after the conviction is final, this Court would have been incapable of withdrawing relief. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. That constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state courts.  I doubt that today’s rule will fare any better. 6/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264, reversed and remanded. Cf.  The Court in the mid-20th century was confounded by what Justice Harlan called the “swift pace of constitu- tional change,” Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2, 4 (1963) (dissenting opinion), as it vacated and remanded many cases in the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Armour v. Indianapolis, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted; ellipsis in original). was plainly mistaken”). And here it confronts a second obstacle to its desired outcome.  To be sure, Miller’s holding has a procedural component. It held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.” Id., at 328. Pp. 5–8. In 1963, 17-year-old Henry Montgomery was arrested for the murder of Sheriff Deputy Charles Hurt in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Ante, at 7–8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But a majority of this Court, eager to reach the merits of this case, resolves the question of our jurisdiction by deciding that the Constitution requires state postconviction courts to adopt Teague’s exception for  so-called “substantive” new rules and to provide state-law remedies for the violations of those rules to prisoners whose sentences long ago became final. under the Eighth Amendment.” See ante, at 13.  Unlike the rule the Court announces today, this limitation at least reflects a constitutional principle. That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the degree of procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive guarantee. The Court invokes only the Supremacy Clause, asserting that the Clause deprives state and federal postconviction courts alike of power to leave an unconstitutional sentence in place. Const., Amdt. See, e.g., State v. Dyer, 2011–1758, pp.  Louisiana nonetheless argues that Miller is procedural because it did not place any punishment beyond the State’s power to impose; it instead required sentencing courts to take children’s age into account before condemning them to die in prison. Throughout our history, postconviction relief for alleged constitutional defects in a conviction or sentence was available as a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command. Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing judge take into account “how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Ibid. Montgomery alleges that Miller announced a substantive constitutional rule and that the Louisiana Supreme Court erred by failing to recognize its retroactive effect. Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence. 11/5/13), 130 So. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed his conviction after finding that public prejudice had pre- vented a fair trial. He has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities. “[E]ven the use of impeccable factfinding proce dures could not legitimate a verdict” where “the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment.” United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 724 (1971). The population of Montgomery was 726 at the 2010 census. Of course. As Justice Cardozo said, ‘We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject’ ”). 1993); Mead, 165 So. Our equal protection precedents, therefore, do not compel a uniform rule of retroactivity in direct and collateral proceedings for new substantive  constitutional rules.  Miller took as its starting premise the principle established in Roper and Graham that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (citing Roper, supra, at 569–570; and Graham, supra, at 68).  The parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. There most certainly is a grandfather clause—one we have called finality—which says that the Constitution does not require States to revise punishments that were lawful when  they were imposed. The town has a poverty rate of 37 percent and a median household income of just under $22,000. After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence.  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Amicus argues that a State is under no obligation to give a new rule of constitutional law retroactive effect in its own collateral review proceedings. See Mackey, supra, at 692–693 (opinion of Harlan, J.) Whatever the desirability of that choice, it is one the Constitution allows States to make. Almost 50 years later, in 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller v.  Even if due process required courts to anticipate this Court’s new substantive rules, it would not compel courts to revisit settled convictions or sentences on collateral review. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”). In Montgomery v.Louisiana, 577 U. S. ____ (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed how state courts should apply its decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that requires life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. But the Court’s reinvention of Siebold as a constitutional imperative eliminates any room for legislative adjustment. Cornell Montgomery is associated with 1 company in Carencro, LA There is 1 individual that goes by the name of Cornell Montgomery in Louisiana. In Siebold, however, the petitioners attacked the judgments on the ground that they had been convicted under unconstitutional statutes.  When Teague followed on Griffith’s heels two years later, the opinion contained no discussion of “basic norms of constitutional adjudication,” Griffith, supra, at 322, nor any discussion of the obligations of state courts. In support of this argument, Louisiana points to Miller’s statement that the decision “does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham. The Court wrote that requiring sentencers to consider “children’s diminished culpability, and heightened capacity for change” should make such sentences “uncommon.”. 441, 466 (1963). A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them. It follows that when a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful. 882. Art. Having distorted Teague, the majority simply proceeds to rewrite Miller.  “[O]ur jurisprudence concerning the ‘retroactivity’ of ‘new rules’ of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 290–291 (2008). of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Amdts. It insists that Miller barred life-without-parole sentences “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.  The Court portrays Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880), as a departure from this history and as the genesis of a constitutional principle that “a conviction obtained under an unconstitutional law warrants habeas relief.” Ante, at 12. et al. Teague warned against the intrusiveness of “continually forc[ing] the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.” 489 U. S., at 310. How could the majority—in an opinion written by the very author of Roper—now say that punishment is also unconstitutional? Cornell Hood is listed as a Manager with Skyy Transportation LLC in Louisiana. The father agreed to pay the mother $1,864 monthly in combined child and spousal support based on income of approximately $60,000 per year. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the  Constitution. No principle of equal protection requires the criminal law of all ages to be the same. Pp. 14–21. 3d 928, 928–929 (per curiam) (considering claim on collateral review that this Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, rendered peti tioner’s life-without-parole sentence illegal). And again five years ago this Court left in place this severe sanction for juvenile homicide offenders. The Equal Protection Clause?  Because of the Supremacy Clause, says the majority.  The majority relies on the statement in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715 (1971), that “ ‘[n]o circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity’ ” than when “ ‘the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment.’ ” Ante, at 9–10 (quoting 401 U. S., at 724). And the First Congress, in prescribing federal habeas jurisdiction in the 1789 Judiciary Act, understood its scope to reflect “the black-letter principle of the common law that the writ was simply not available at all to one convicted of crime by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. Courts have reached different conclusions on this point.  In this case, the Court must address part of the question left open in Danforth. Whether a new rule bars States from proscribing certain conduct or from inflicting a certain punishment, “[i]n both cases, the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain pen- alty.” Id., at 330.  Substantive rules, then, set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose. Louisiana’s capital punishment scheme did not include a sentencing phase, so Montgomery did not present mitigating evidence. Under this view, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision does not implicate a federal right; it only determines the scope of relief avail- able in a particular type of state proceeding—a question of state law beyond this Court’s power to review. Turning to the facts before it, the Court decided it was within its power to hear Siebold’s claim, which did not merely protest that the conviction and sentence were “erroneous” but contended that the statute he was con- victed of violating was unconstitutional and the conviction therefore void: “[I]f the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes.” Id., at 376–377. The father enrolled in a part time law program and after 9 years graduated and acce… Teague held that federal habeas courts could no longer upset state-court convictions for violations of so-called “new rules,” not yet announced when the conviction became final. Code Crim. 1970). State v. Montgomery, 181 So. 2d 756, 762 (La.  Teague announced that federal courts could not grant habeas corpus to overturn state convictions on the basis of a “new rule” of constitutional law—meaning one announced after the convictions became final—unless that new rule was a “substantive rule” or a “watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure.” 489 U. S., at 311. Teague adopted that reasoning. 552 U. S., at 266. As the Court explains, States must enforce a constitutional right to remedies on collateral review only if such pro-ceedings are “open to a claim controlled by federal law.” Ante, at 13. Sentencing errors must instead be raised through Louisiana’s second collateral review procedure. Miller held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “ ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). “Section 2254(d)(1) [of the federal habeas statute] refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that ‘resulted in’ a decision that was contrary to, or ‘involved’ an unreasonable application of, established law. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. In the wake of Miller, the question has arisen whether its holding is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.  It is undisputed, then, that Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings. As Justice Bradley, Siebold’s author, later observed for the Court: “It is difficult to see why a conviction and punishment under an unconstitutional law is more violative of a person’s constitutional rights, than an unconstitutional conviction and punishment under a valid law.” In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 183 (1889).  Petitioner has discussed in his submissions to this Court his evolution from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member of the prison community. 882, 926 (West 2008). The Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana now requires all states to apply Miller retroactively, which means that in Louisiana, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, and Colorado, hundreds of people who were sentenced to die in prison for crimes when they were children are now entitled to new sentencing hearings. Under this standard, and for the reasons explained below, Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review. That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. Compare and research attorneys in Montgomery, Louisiana on LII The LII Lawyer Directory contains lawyers who have claimed their profiles and are actively seeking clients. But the Court could not find a satisfactory answer: “A judgment may be erroneous and not void, and it may be erroneous because it is void. In February 2017, Montgomery, now 70 years old, remained a prisoner at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola. See Graham, supra, at 59 (“The concept of  proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment”); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367 (1910); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 997–998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court now holds that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Montgomery’s motion argued that Miller rendered his mandatory life-without-parole sentence illegal. Miller therefore announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, which, like other substantive rules, is retroactive because it “ ‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’ ”—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—“ ‘faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.’ ” Schriro, supra, at 352.  A State may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders.   The Court’s holding also cannot be grounded in the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on “depriv[ations] . . . 567 U. S., at ___, n. 4 (slip op., at 8, n. 4). Under Louisiana law, this verdict required the trial court to impose a sentence of life without parole. The power to rule prospectively in this way is a quintessentially legislative power. The only difference between Roper and Graham, on the one hand, and Miller, on the other hand, is that Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1257 only if the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision implicates a federal right. Both statutory and (increasingly) constitutional laws change. What silliness. Stat. for Cert. Once a conviction has become final, whether new rules or old ones will be applied to revisit the conviction is a matter entirely within the State’s control; the Constitution has nothing to say about that choice. See Wright, supra, at 285 (recounting history). The Court explained that if “this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings.” Id., at 376. In doing so, the court stated that it was “not bound” to adopt that federal framework. 3d 1044, 1047; see also State v. Alexander, 2014–0401 (La. 4 Cir. In 1963, Montgomery killed Charles Hurt, a deputy sheriff in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865, 32 U. Chi. Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. First, courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law. Where state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge. The problem is that Miller stated, quite clearly, precisely the opposite: “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that on direct review, a new constitutional rule must be applied retroactively “to all cases, state or federal”). Thus in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court suggested—based on Justice Harlan’s views—that “after we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.” Id., at 322–323. Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences. Rather, it endorses the exception as expanded by Penry, to include “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 492 U. S., at 330. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports with the principles that informed Teague. But nothing in the Constitution’s text or in our constitutional tradition provides such a right to a remedy on collateral review.   (a) Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, a federal habeas case, set forth a framework for the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  The “foundation stone” for Miller’s analysis was this Court’s line of precedent holding certain punishments disproportionate when applied to juveniles. Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an exception to the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, this Court has recognized that substantive rules “are more accurately characterized as . . . On the issue of whether Miller rendered life-without-parole penalties unconstitutional, it is impossible to get past Miller’s unambiguous statement that “[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders” and “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . This holding is limited to Teague’s first exception for substantive rules; the constitutional status of Teague’s exception for watershed rules of procedure need not be addressed here. 1  It is amusing that the majority’s initial description of Miller is the same as our own: “[T]he Court held that a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing.” Ante, at 1. a sentence introducing the case. Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence. Those decisions altered the processes in which States must engage before sentencing a person to death. But one cannot imagine a clearer frustration of the sensible policy of Teague when the ever-moving target of impermissible punishments is at issue. The address on file for this person is 120 Legend Lane, Carencro, LA 70520 in Lafayette County. All of the statements relied on by the majority do nothing more than express the reason why the new, youth-protective procedure prescribed by Miller is desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile offenders. Id., at 261–262.  The majority’s maxim that “state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the Constitution,” ante, at 12–13, begs the question rather than contributes to its solution. The same possibility of a valid result does not exist where a substantive rule has eliminated a State’s power to proscribe the defendant’s conduct or impose a given punishment. In light of what this Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller about how children are constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability, however, prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored. A conviction under an unconstitutional law. Coin & Currency, an opinion written by (guess whom?) Until today, no federal court was constitutionally obliged to grant relief for the past violation of a newly announced substantive rule. 1–4 (La. On June 28, 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated Montgomery's life sentence and remanded for resentencing in a per curiam decision, with Justice Scott Crichton additionally concurring. Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,’ ” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (quoting Roper, supra, at 573), it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of defendants because of their status”—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. This concern has no application in the realm of substantive rules, for no resources marshaled by a State could preserve a conviction or sentence that the Constitution deprives the State of power to impose.  The Court answers that question one way: It says that state postconviction and federal habeas courts are constitutionally required to supply a remedy because a sentence or conviction predicated upon an unconstitutional law is a legal nullity. 3d 829, which held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review. We have never understood due process to require further proceedings once a trial ends.  This second mechanism allows a prisoner to bring a collateral attack on his or her sentence by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence. That would support the Court’s holding Clause principles in its postconviction proceedings grant relief for the reasons below! 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